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                  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
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    In Re:
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    THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND
    MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, )
 5
         as representatives of )
                                        No. 17 BK 3283-LTS
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    THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO,
 7
    et al,
 8
                   Debtors
                                        Pages 1 - 100
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    THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,
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                   Plaintiff
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                                        Adv. Proc.
              V.
                                        No. 17-133-LTS in
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    PUERTO RICO SALES TAX FINANCING ) 17 BK 3284-LTS
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    CORPORTION (COFINA), et al,
                   Defendants
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                               HEARING
                 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDITH GAIL DEIN
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                    UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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                                  United States District Court
                                  1 Courthouse Way, Courtroom 18
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                                  Boston, Massachusetts 02210
                                  July 5, 2017, 10:43 a.m.
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              LEE A. MARZILLI and KELLY MORTELLITE
                     OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
24
                  United States District Court
                  1 Courthouse Way, Room 7200
25
                       Boston, MA 02210
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1 APPEARANCES: SUSHEEL KIRPALANI, ESQ., Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & 2 Sullivan, for COFINA Senior Bondholders' Coalition. 3 RAFAEL ESCALERA, ESQ., Reichard & Escalera, for COFINA 4 Senior Bondholders' Coalition. 5 BRANT DUNCAN KUEHN, ESQ., Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, for COFINA Senior Bondholders' Coalition. 6 ANDREW M. LEBLANC, ESQ. and GRANT R. MAINLAND, ESQ., 7 Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy, for Ambac Assurance Corporation. 8 DAVID M. SCHLECKER, ESQ. and C. NEIL GRAY, ESQ., Reed Smith, for Bank of New York Mellon. 9 10 SALVATORE A. ROMANELLO, ESQ. and JARED R. FRIEDMAN, ESQ., Weil Gotshal & Manges, for National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation. 11 12 LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ., Paul Hastings, LLP, for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the Commonwealth of 13 Puerto Rico. 14 KENNETH R. DAVID, ESQ., Kasowitz Benson Torres, for the Whitebox Funds. 15 MR. RANDALL OPPENHEIMER, ESQ., PETER FRIEDMANN, ESQ., and DANIEL L. CANTOR, ESQ., O'Melveny & Myers, for the 16 Non-Debtor Governmental Actors. 17 ELLEN M. HALSTEAD, ESQ., Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft, 18 for Municipal Corp. TIMOTHY W. MUNGOVAN, ESQ., Proskauer Rose, for the 19 Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico 20 (FOMB). 21 22 23 24 25

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: You may be seated. The United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico is now in
session. The United States Magistrate Judge Judith Gail
Dein is presiding in Massachusetts in the matters of In Re:
The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto
Rico, as representative of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
et al, Bankruptcy No. 17-3283-LTS, and also in the matter of
In re: The Financial Oversight and Management Board for
Puerto Rico, as representatives of Puerto Rico Sales Tax
Financing Corporation, also known as COFINA, Bankruptcy
No. 17-3284-LTS, and also in the matter of the Bank of New
York Mellon as Trustee Plaintiff v. Puerto Rico Sales Tax
Financing Corporation, COFINA, et al, Adversary
Proceeding 17-133-LTS.

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the latest location for sitting of the Court of Puerto Rico, and welcome to those who are listening in various locations.

I hope everybody is here ready to work today, all right, because I have all your pleadings. I know you had a nice relaxing weekend -- I did not -- but I've been through all of it, but now we're getting down to some real work on some real cases that need to be resolved. The summary judgment deadlines are real, these are real disputes, and we're going to need to figure out how to get from here to

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     there in a short amount of time.
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               I think, just scheduling things, we're going to
     break at 12:00 to 1:00 for lunch to accommodate the schedule
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     in Puerto Rico. I ask everybody to talk in their
     microphones, and it's probably easiest, at least at the
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     beginning, to use the podium, and then we'll see. And I
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     will ask my standard discovery question: Has everybody
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     resolved all their disputes over the weekend? And I see no
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     one raising their hands. I do see a lot of laughter.
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               Okay, so I think it makes the most sense for me,
     actually, to start with the bank's dispute with the COFINA
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     Senior Bondholders' Coalition, and just, as usual, identify
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     yourself when you speak.
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               MR. KIRPALANI: Thank you, your Honor. Nice to
     see you again. Susheel Kirpalani of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
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     & Sullivan on behalf of the COFINA Seniors Bondholder
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     Coalition.
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               THE COURT: And wait. Who's from the bank?
               MR. SCHLECKER: Your Honor, David Schlecker from
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     the law firm Reed Smith representing the Bank of New York
     Mellon.
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               THE COURT: Okay, do you want to go first?
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               MR. SCHLECKER: I think it makes more sense.
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               THE COURT: Let me hear from him first.
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MR. SCHLECKER: Thank you, your Honor.

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discovery motion that the Bank of New York Mellon has -- and just let me say at the outset that we have been successful in resolving all discovery disputes with all other parties except for the Senior Bondholder Coalition, and the discovery dispute that we have with them is very specific and straightforward.

THE COURT: So does that mean Ambac has been resolved?

MR. SCHLECKER: Yes, your Honor. As of just, I think it was yesterday, last night, the dispute with Ambac has been resolved, which leaves only one dispute.

THE COURT: All right, I'm one for one. Go.

MR. SCHLECKER: The dispute concerns the Coalition's refusal to produce documents in its possession that pertain to the Whitebox entities, et al. They simply refuse to do so on the grounds that we perhaps should be able to get those documents from Whitebox itself directly.

The other aspect of the dispute concerns our request that the Senior Bondholder Coalition turn over documents relating to Ambac, another defendant in this case. The Coalition, however, has taken the position that it would only produce Ambac documents from May 1, 2017, to date; in other words, from two months ago to date. The reason they claim not to produce Ambac documents is because they believe that the only relevant dispute concerns the events of May 1,

2017, and therefore they're not willing to produce documents 1 2 prior to that time pertaining to Ambac. Your Honor, in terms of these arguments, we've 3 4 cited cases to the Court in terms of how it is perfectly appropriate to request similar documents from different 5 6 parties in this case. Indeed, doing so insures that we get 7 a fulsome production with respect to the Whitebox documents 8 as well as the Ambac documents. With respect to --9 THE COURT: But let me ask, did you go directly to 10 Whitebox? Have you received documents from them? MR. SCHLECKER: Well, we certainly have requested 11 12 documents from Whitebox. They have responded, but we have resolved any dispute we have with Whitebox. We haven't seen 13 14 their production yet, and we hope that it's all there is, 15 but we don't know for sure. THE COURT: And you've agreed on parameters with 16 17 them? 18 MR. SCHLECKER: Oh, yes, yes. 19 THE COURT: Okay. And so you're seeking the same 20 types of documents through the Coalition? 21 MR. SCHLECKER: Yes. What we're seeking is certainly the communications between members of the 22 Coalition and Whitebox, communications between the members 23

of the Senior Bondholder Coalition and Ambac, as well as,

you know, whatever other documents that might pertain to the

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requests that we have provided, the document requests that we have served on them. And we do believe -- we're producing documents from January 1 of 2015 to date. We think it's appropriate for the Senior Bondholder Coalition to do a search that spans that period of time, particularly since other defendants, including Whitebox and Ambac, they have taken the position that events going as far back as 2015 are relevant to these proceedings.

THE COURT: So that's one of the issues that we're going to need to resolve today is sort of how far back it goes for everyone. Let me deal with them separately, though. On the repeat documents, is what you're asking for, do you expect the Coalition to produce documents from other members of the Coalition besides Whitebox for these Whitebox communications? Is that the issue?

MR. SCHLECKER: Well, we're expecting them to produce the documents — the members of the Coalition should produce documents in their possession to the extent that there are communications between those members and Whitebox, between those members and Ambac, and obviously among themselves that pertain to the particular requests.

THE COURT: Okay. And for the timing, I recognize that you've agreed to produce back to 2015, but I'm actually not sure that's the right scope, so let me make that clear. But I'm assuming that you don't really care, provided that

1 it's uniform. 2 MR. SCHLECKER: Correct, your Honor. I mean, all I can say is, other parties have claimed that events 3 4 starting as far back as 2015 are relevant and have sought discovery from Bank of New York Mellon as well as other 5 parties, and therefore, you know, whether it's relevant is 6 7 not for our determination obviously. It's ultimately the Court's determination as to what constitutes documents that 8 will eventually be heard and relevant, but we're prepared to 9 10 do that. THE COURT: The bank itself didn't take the 11 12 position that 2015 events or 2016 events constituted events 13 of default? 14 MR. SCHLECKER: That's correct. Indeed, we certainly did not take that position. 15 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. SCHLECKER: Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Now... 19 MR. KIRPALANI: Thank you, your Honor. Again, 20 Susheel Kirpalani for the record on behalf of the COFINA Senior Bondholder Coalition. My colleague, Brant Kuehn, is 21 22 going to address the discovery disputes today, and my cocounsel from Puerto Rico would like to have some one-minute 23

opportunity to address the Court on just some Puerto Rico

transparency issues that are germane really to our motion,

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not this motion. But to try to address, I want to contextualize what the Bank of New York's position is with respect to our Coalition before Mr. Kuehn can address the specifics of our position on the discovery because your Honor is maybe a bit new to this. I'm sure you had a very busy weekend reading and catching up, but with respect to Bank of New York's position, the COFINA Senior Bondholder Coalition began in the spring of 2015 with a handful of holders holding a couple hundred million dollars of COFINA senior bonds. Today we're eleven institutions, asset managers, with over \$100 billion of assets, so just to give you a sense of scale of how large these institutions are. Among them -- and we hold in excess of or approximately \$2.5 billion of the COFINA senior bonds. Among the eleven institutions is Whitebox, and our Coalition works with other senior bondholder representatives like Ambac and National trying to coordinate efforts and things of that nature.

For purposes of the Bank of New York litigation, this piece of the Title III case, Whitebox is separately represented by counsel, and our Coalition disagrees with some of the things that Whitebox has advanced in terms of issues in dispute. And so what the Bank of New York I think may be confusing is, the remaining ten institutions who do not take certain positions are willing to provide discovery on the positions that we are taking, which are germane to

the event of default in this phase of the litigation; but beyond that is a scope issue that in fairness and in proportionality to the other ten institutions that we represent who have internal counsel, regulatory counsel, their own computer servers to search, it's just a huge burden. But if I could defer to Mr. Kuehn on the specifics of the back-and-forth with Mr. -- I think it's Schlecker on behalf of the Bank of New York, I think that might be illuminating.

THE COURT: All right, I don't need all of your details of how you've communicated this, all right, back and forth. I do need to know sort of where you are, and I need to understand, given that there are these ten other institutions, is it your understanding that you would be producing communications from each one of them, or is there a central organization that sort of gets copied on everything?

MR. KUEHN: Your Honor, Brant Kuehn. There is no central organization that's copied on all of these emails.

As such, we need to search the emails of each of the clients. I just want to put something in context here, and that is that the Coalition has already agreed to run a substantial list of search terms across documents in response to the Bank of New York's request for the more limited time frame that we have agreed upon. So the dispute

is really only about these narrow two terms, which
Mr. Kirpalani has already explained the additional burden.

The other point I would like to make is that what we're talking about here is Phase 2 of the litigation,

Phase 2 of this proceeding; and I'm sure you're well aware that the issues in Phase 2 are whether there has been an event of default, whether that has been cured, and whether the bonds can be accelerated. In addition, there's Phase 3 that's coming in the future which relates to whether Bank of New York should have accelerated, should have declared an event of default earlier. It's my position that the documents that the Bank of New York seeks with respect to the Ambac communications and the Whitebox communications really relate at their heart to Phase 3 and not to Phase 2.

THE COURT: Because of the timing or because of the content?

MR. KUEHN: Because of the content. An event of default occurs based on what the government parties do, not based on what the creditors do. So to the extent that we're discussing whether there's been an event of default and we need to litigate that, what's relevant are documents that are created and come from the government parties.

THE COURT: But presumably he's asked you for documents that say: Have you discussed this? What's your position on, has there been a default in 2017? I assume

that the event of default that's being discussed are sort of this failure to defend and otherwise safeguard these assets.

MR. KUEHN: Correct. And with respect to the documents dated from May 1, 2017, to date, which we believe are the key documents for the purposes of Phase 2, we have agreed to produce those. The issue is the earlier time frames.

THE COURT: All right, so tell me why May 1 as opposed to January 1, 2017, in the 2017 context. I understand the 2015, 2016, and we'll talk about that in the context of the other motions, but why May 1?

MR. KUEHN: That was the result of negotiation with the Bank of New York, who agreed on that date with us. The date was selected because, again, our position is that creditor documents --

THE COURT: I truly have never been told to be louder, never ever.

MR. KUEHN: Our position is that creditor documents have limited relevance to the questions of whether there's been an event of default, but out of a good-faith effort to come to an agreement with Bank of New York, again, we agreed to produce substantial documents from a later date, which is the events of default that we believe are most relevant. And once those events of default had been noticed, that's where we believe that creditor documents

could become more relevant. And, again, that date was one that the Bank of New York agreed to with respect to every other search term and every other document request other than Ambac and Whitebox documents. And, again, those are the two parties that have filed lawsuits against Bank of New York, which we believe is why those documents are relevant to Phase 3, the question of Bank of New York's potential liability, not the question of whether there's been an event of default.

THE COURT: All right. And what about the claim that they're repetitive or they get them straight from Whitebox?

MR. KUEHN: That really comes down to proportionality. I would agree that it is not a de facto rule that simply because you can obtain documents from one party you can't obtain them from another. That's really not the core of why we think it's unnecessary to produce those documents. It's just part of the analysis of why we think it's not proportional.

THE COURT: But you are running the search terms, so I don't have anything here that says adding the Whitebox search term substantially increases the burden.

MR. KUEHN: It's simply a matter of the additional date range.

THE COURT: Okay, so we're focusing on the date

1 range, not on the --2 MR. KUEHN: Correct. THE COURT: Okay. All right, do you want to be 3 heard on just the date range? 5 MR. SCHLECKER: Sure. Shall I do it from here? THE COURT: Yes, and you can remain seated if 6 7 you --8 MR. SCHLECKER: Thank you, your Honor. Just very briefly, with respect to the date range, I will read to you 9 10 the scheduling order that was put in place in this case. The very first paragraph specifically states, "The following 11 12 deadlines shall apply to the stage of this adversary 13 proceeding in which the Court will determine the parties' 14 respective interests in the disputed funds, including 15 whether, and if so when, an event of default occurred on 16 government resolution." 17 The fact that Judge Swain indicated when, not just 18 whether, to me indicates that it is quite unclear as to whether she believes that events prior to May 1, 2017, are 19 20 at issue. And I think it's not appropriate for the Senior 21 Bondholder Coalition to unilaterally say that because they 22 take the position that it's only as of May 1, 2017, is the relevant date, that that's all they're going to search, and 23 especially since we know that other parties in this case 24 25 have taken the position that facts prior to that are

absolutely in dispute and at issue in this Phase 2 proceeding.

THE COURT: So this is the question that I have, and maybe you can help me with it. It seems to me we need to limit in this Phase 2 the events of default that we're talking about because otherwise we will never get to summary judgment, so let's make that clear. It also seems to me that if there is an event of default in 2017, then that is critical; and whether there were other events of default earlier may relate to the bank's failure or decision not to call an event of default, but as far as the allocation of funds isn't going to matter. I mean, the 2017 is really the core issue.

What I don't get a sense of is whether there's a difference between sort of January 1, 2017, or March 30, 2017, you know, the fiscal plan. Is that the critical date? Does it make sense to go back to January 1, 2017, sort of for everything here? The May I don't really understand.

MR. SCHLECKER: Your Honor, certainly the Bank of New York doesn't take the position that anything prior to May 1 or May 4 of 2017 has any bearing at all on any of these matters.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHLECKER: So if your Honor wants to get clarification as to why the earlier date ought to be appropriate in terms of Phase 2, I really suggest that some

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     of the other parties need to be involved in the discussion.
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                THE COURT: All right, so why don't --
               MR. SCHLECKER: Specifically Whitebox and Ambac.
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                THE COURT: All right, I don't want them to talk
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     yet.
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               MR. SCHLECKER: Okay.
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                THE COURT: Do you want to respond?
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               MR. KUEHN: I suppose I can speak here?
                THE COURT: Yes.
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               MR. KUEHN: Your Honor, if it would simplify the
     proceeding, I think that we would agree to produce the
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     Ambac- and Whitebox-related documents going back to a date
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     before May 1, and we think that the appropriate date, if
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     we're working on these date issues, for the creditor
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     production, for our production, could be the date that the
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     fiscal plan was announced, which would be in March, 2017.
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                THE COURT: Let's do that.
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               MR. KUEHN: Thank you.
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                THE COURT: All right, so as I understand it,
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     there's really no question of this duplicative issue. That
     seems to have faded away. So for Ambac and Whitebox, you'll
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     go back to -- what did I say, March 13?
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                MR. KUEHN: Sure, March 13.
                THE COURT: 2017, okay? Am I two for two?
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     you go.
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All right, so then I guess we're up to the Senior Bondholders' requests. Who's doing that?

MR. KUEHN: Your Honor, at root, the government parties' refusal to produce documents in response to the COFINA senior parties' request is really just an attempt to relitigate the Court's June 6 discovery order setting the scope of discovery or setting the process for resolving the issues in this Phase 2 of the interpleader action. On June 1 and June 2, the government parties submitted motions to the Court asking the Court to avoid discovery altogether and simply move directly to dispositive motions, arguing that the question of whether there had been an event of default, which is the key portion of Phase 2 of this litigation, could be decided exclusively on public documents. Obviously four days later the Court decided that that wasn't the case and ordered document discovery as well as depositions.

In order to justify the refusal to produce documents, the government parties have offered several excuses or several reasons why they think it's not necessary: First, they've argued that the documents that the COFINA senior parties have requested are not relevant. That's simply not the case, and I'll explain why. Second, they've argued that the documents the COFINA senior parties have sought are privileged, particularly under the

deliberative process privilege. Again, we believe that is not the case, and I will explain why. And, third, they have refused entirely to produce any electronically stored information, emails, text messages, anything. They've also refused to produce any sort of log of those documents with respect to the documents they claim are privileged.

So if I may, I'd like to go through those three issues. First off, with respect to relevance, again, my position is that the Court has already decided that documents beyond publicly available materials are relevant to this proceeding, and that's why the Court ordered discovery.

THE COURT: All right, but help me out here.

You've made the statement that the government parties have

put their intent at issue, and they may turn around and say,

"No, we haven't." Flesh that out for me.

MR. KUEHN: Sure, absolutely. So the government parties have made an argument in their briefing, in particular on Monday, that there's no ambiguity about the resolution, and I would agree with that; and obviously we're not seeking documents related to the meaning of the contract, the drafting of the resolution. What is ambiguous is what the government acts mean with respect to their obligations under the resolution. And what I'm getting at is that there have been several acts, in particular over the

last six months, which indicate that the government parties do actually intend to take COFINA's dedicated sales tax from COFINA, which is clearly a violation of the covenants in the resolution. However, those acts are ambiguous.

On March 13, of course, the government parties proposed and approved a fiscal plan which mathematically indicates that they intend to take COFINA's dedicated sales tax and use it for other purposes, simply by virtue of the fact that it doesn't allow enough debt service to cover even COFINA's dedicated sales tax for the year 2018, amongst other years. Now, again, the document itself doesn't specifically say, "We're taking COFINA's dedicated sales tax," but it's clearly the implication.

Later, one of the government parties, Mr. Elias
Sanchez, who is the representative of the Oversight Board,
or the representative of the Commonwealth for the Oversight
Board, stated publicly that the intent of the fiscal plan
was to pool all the resources, including COFINA's dedicated
sales tax, which, again, we take the position is not within
their control. It's not within the hands of the
Commonwealth. They've indicated then that that's the intent
of the fiscal plan. Subsequently they passed the compliance
law, which by its own terms empowers AAFAF to take the
dedicated sales tax from COFINA. On the same day, the
Governor issued an explanatory statement which said that's

not really the intent, but I don't know what any of this means. It seems to me that it's ambiguous what the actual intent and what the actual meaning of these statements are, what the actual meaning of the law is, what the actual meaning of the structure that the Commonwealth government parties have put in place is; and in order to understand what that means, we need to have access to the documents that explain what those parties really intend to do and what those statements really mean because I think they're ambiguous.

The second point with respect to relevance is that we do actually have a disagreement, I think, with the government parties on what their obligations are under the resolution. My position is that committing acts that set in motion the process of taking COFINA's dedicated sales tax is itself a breach of the covenants. By way of illustration, COFINA is obligated under Section 705 of the resolution to protect and defend the pledge of the dedicated sales tax. If other parties within the government are setting up the structure which allows that dedicated sales tax to be confiscated and taken back from COFINA and if COFINA does nothing, that's a violation of that covenant, whether or not it's public or not.

THE COURT: But if I said to the government entities, "If you don't produce a document in this, you

can't use it, period," what argument would you make on your summary judgments? Like, what do you need the documents for? Because it seems to me you have some fundamental legal issues that need to be resolved. You need to know the scope of their duties. You need to know, is it an affirmative obligation to stop something or not? Is leaving it ambiguous a violation of their obligations? But what somebody thought about what the fiscal plan is going to do, I don't know what that adds to your summary judgment.

MR. KUEHN: Because the messages so far are mixed. We've heard that we're not going to take the dedicated sales tax and the structure is not designed to take the dedicated sales tax. We've heard that it is designed to cool the resources and take the dedicated sales tax. And so we need to be able to resolve that factual ambiguity. Regardless of what the duties actually are -- and again I agree that that's eventually going to be a legal question as to how you interpret the duties under the resolution -- but the factual matter of whether they've complied with those duties is not clear from the face of the documents that are publicly available.

THE COURT: So let's say you end up with communications that are split, that you have some people saying, "This is what I intended when I put a fiscal plan forward," and then somebody else says, "But that's not what

I intended when I put it forward," does that preclude you from moving for summary judgment?

MR. KUEHN: No, I don't believe it would, but we would argue that depending on what the facts show, depending on who intends what, that we will be able to show that the party that intended to take the dedicated sales tax speaks on behalf of AAFAF and thus has violated the terms of the resolution, has breached that covenant.

THE COURT: The other problem that I have here is,
I have both extremes. I have you asking for everything, and
I have the government refusing to produce anything, which
makes it easy, or hard; I don't know which. What are you
really looking for?

MR. KUEHN: If this process had begun earlier, if the government parties had reached out to us when we initially served the document demands, and we had at that point been able to create a protocol that narrowed and created a way for them to review the documents in time to produce them by the end of discovery, you know, I think that we would be in a very different place. The problem is that there's been a pattern of delay, and I think what's really happening is, they're trying to run out the clock. You know, they're hoping that if we wait long enough, they'll get the result that they actually asked for on June 1 and June 2, which is to produce nothing. I think that the

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obviously reasonable way to solve the issue right now is to simply ask them to produce the documents that hit our search terms that relate to, again, the issues of, you know, what the parties have done, what the government parties have done behind the scenes in the time leading up to today; and if they want to address the deliberative process privilege on a document-by-document basis after the documents have been produced, we're willing to agree that the production of the documents doesn't waive the deliberative process privilege. That's fine. But I think that the only real solution at this point in time is to order the production of the documents that hit the search terms that we proposed to them ourselves. You know, they didn't propose search terms to They didn't come us to and say, "Here's what we think are the relevant custodians." They never came to us with custodians.

THE COURT: How many custodians have you proposed? Have you proposed custodians?

MR. KUEHN: No, we haven't proposed custodians because we don't know who are the relevant parties.

Obviously we've served subpoenas and asked for the specific individuals we know are relevant, Mr. Elias Sanchez,

Governor Rossello, and Mr. Portello; but, interestingly, on Monday the government parties acknowledged that they've identified forty individuals, forty potential custodians who

have relevant documents. At least that's my reading of Paragraph 6 of their corrected motion filed Monday evening.

THE COURT: And is there any reason that this, from your point of view, needs to go before March 13, 2017?

MR. KUEHN: From the perspective of the COFINA
Senior Bondholder Coalition, and for this point I'm not
speaking for Ambac or Whitebox or National, I think that it
should go earlier than March 13, but it doesn't need to go
significantly. We're not talking about 2015. The reason I
say that is that the fiscal plan obviously wasn't developed
on March 13 itself. It took a period of months to develop
that fiscal plan, and the development of the fiscal plan and
the communications related to that development are relevant.

THE COURT: But then you're going to really hit the deliberative process, right?

MR. KUEHN: So I agree that we would hit the deliberative process privilege, but I would also point out that the deliberative process privilege is qualified. And I would note that in the government parties' briefs submitted last Friday, all the cases cited except for Texaco, the one case that we actually rely on substantially, are FOIA cases. And the reason that's significant is that in FOIA, the deliberative process privilege is not qualified. It's absolute. But in the litigation such as this, it is qualified. And the way that we believe these documents are

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relevant relate to in some sense the deliberations of the government itself. It's what they are doing. It's what they're trying to do to take our sales tax. And so I think in this case, where the public interest is so great, and where our interest is so great at getting at the truth, and where the documents go directly to the process itself, I think that the privilege must yield to these important considerations. You know, we've seen that before. know, we cited actually one of your Honor's cases, Williams v. City of Boston, and, you know --THE COURT: You will learn -- this is my word -it made sense at the time. It was fact-specific. That's my theme, and I stick with it whenever anybody cites a case to me. MR. KUEHN: I think in this case it is very factspecific. You know, we are interested in what the fiscal plan really means and what the parties have done to set up a structure which has the ultimate effect of taking the dedicated sales tax, which is itself a breach of the resolution. THE COURT: Though there have been discussions afterwards. MR. KUEHN: Absolutely. THE COURT: There have been explanations or purported partial explanations afterwards.

MR. KUEHN: No question. Communications that occurred after the decision, under First Circuit precedent, are clearly outside of the privilege.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KUEHN: What it comes down to, your Honor, the government had a decision in formulating the fiscal plan. They could have kept COFINA's dedicated sales tax separate or they could have pooled it. They chose to pool it. We believe that's a violation of the covenants, and we need to understand why.

THE COURT: Let me actually hear from the government on those issues, and then we'll switch.

MR. CANTOR: Good morning, your Honor. Dan Cantor on behalf of what we've called the non-debtor government parties. There were a number of things that I just heard from counsel that were surprising to me. I was surprised to hear that they're not seeking documents concerning the drafting of the plan or legislation. In fact there are a number of specific requests that seek just that. I was surprised that in response to your question about how we get between all or nothing, their answer was that the only real solution is all. But perhaps what I was most surprised about was to hear them say that somehow the issue of whether there was a breach here is something that is going to be based on documents that they now consider to be ambiguous;

that the reason that they need to get into the deliberations of the government is that somehow what happened here, the facts of what happened here are ambiguous. This is 180 degrees opposite of the position that they took when they responded to the trustee's original motion in the interpleader action where they said that the covenants were clear and unambiguous and that the Court could determine whether there had been a breach of those covenants as a matter of law. And that's what we agree, your Honor, is the case here. Counsel's last comment was about needing to get into why things were done. No, you don't need to get into why things were done. The issues here are very simple and straightforward: As they said, was there a breach? Was it curable? Was it cured?

And there is no dispute here among the various parties as to what happened. The various parties have come up with seven different instances of breach. Not all of them agree on what breaches there were, but in total there are seven different instances. But everyone agrees as to what happened here, right? Everyone agrees as to what plans were proposed, what laws were passed, what litigations were filed, and what public actions COFINA did or did not take here. This is all a matter of public record, and the only question that the Court is going to have to answer on summary judgment is whether any of these events are an event

of default, whether there's been a breach of the bond resolution, and this is a pure question of law that does not require discovery.

Let me also say, your Honor, that your Honor made a comment about the fact that it's all or nothing. We're not saying nothing. We actually have in fact agreed to produce a variety of types of documents. We have agreed to produce documents, hard-copy documents. Non-email documents that exist on the computers of relevant custodians, we've produced some of that. We would have produced more if the confidentiality order was in place, and when it is, we will be in a position to produce --

THE COURT: What kinds of documents are you producing?

MR. CANTOR: We're going to be producing bank statements, financial statements. We would produce non-email correspondence with third parties. I would also note that the parties have available to them everything that's in the data room that was created in connection with the fiscal plan, which is a huge amount of information about, you know, how the fiscal plan was created and how the fiscal plan works. So they've got an enormous amount of information available to them, and, as I said, we are willing to search for certain documents and produce certain documents. We draw the line at the email because the email

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is just so over the top in terms of how broad it is, how burdensome it will be.

But the bottom line is, the issues in this case that need to be decided on whether there's been a breach, a cure, et cetera, they're issues that can be phrased in terms of questions beginning with "what." What happened here? What does it mean for the bond resolution? And the discovery they're seeking, as you heard counsel say, is almost exclusively addressed to questions of "why," and "why" is not an issue here: Why did the government do this? Why did the government decide to do one thing versus another? That's not the question here. The covenants at issue are black and white: Either something happened or something didn't happen. There's no state-of-mind issue here. It doesn't matter whether a covenant was breached negligently, recklessly, maliciously, whatever. None of that matters. The only question is, under the clear and unambiguous terms, as they've told you, under the clear and unambiguous terms of the resolution, and based on the clear and unambiguous terms of the acts that were passed or the plan, has there been a breach of one of these covenants? THE COURT: Let me ask you this: Am I oversimplifying things if I say to you, is really the issue here what all of these things, the fiscal plan, the

resolutions, the compliance law, what happens to the

1 dedicated sales tax? I mean, that's the issue, right? 2 MR. CANTOR: I think that's right. THE COURT: And that's a "what" question, though, 3 4 and what he's saying to me, I think --5 MR. CANTOR: Right. THE COURT: -- is that there's mixed messages 6 7 coming out of the government as to what happens to this 8 sales tax under these plans. And if we were able to limit discovery to that issue -- in addition, you know, you've 9 produced that you have that room, and it's got some drafts 10 and it's got some financial data, and I think that a lot of 11 12 that is beyond the scope of really this proceeding -- but if 13 we were able somehow to limit discovery to what does the 14 government say happens to this dedicated sales tax 15 throughout these proceedings, doesn't that move it forward? 16 MR. CANTOR: Well, but you don't need to get into 17 the emails of the government and into the deliberative 18 discussions of the government in order to answer that question. The government acts through public acts and 19 20 pronouncements. If their claim is that notwithstanding what 21 has been said, the government might do something different 22 in the future, then essentially they're admitting that 23 there's been no breach yet, just that there might be a breach in the future. But in terms of what has actually 24 25 happened here -- and, as I said, there is no dispute as to

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what has actually happened in the public realm here -that's what is at issue in this lawsuit, in the interpleader action, is, what has actually happened? Is it a default? Can it be cured? Has it been cured? You don't need to get into all of the deliberations that went on behind scene as to what they may or may not do or what they may or may not have meant. It's been said over and over that these provisions are clear on their face. If they're a breach, they're a breach. If they're not, they're not, but that's a legal question to be decided. THE COURT: But it sounds like -- what I don't want to do is say to you, "If you haven't produced it, you can't use it, " and then you end up in a summary judgment fight, and you want to use these documents that explain the actions that were taken. I mean, unless you're going to sit here and tell me you're not going to put in any witnesses or any documents --MR. CANTOR: Right. Your Honor, unless I'm mistaken, I don't believe that it's us that will be defending the action. MR. FRIEDMANN: Your Honor, it's Peter Friedmann from O'Melveny & Myers. Is it okay if I --THE COURT: Speak into the mic. MR. FRIEDMANN: It's Peter Friedmann from O'Melveny & Myers. So just to provide a little

background --

THE COURT: And who are you?

MR. FRIEDMANN: I also represent AAFAF and the non-government actors. We did not file an answer. The answer was filed by COFINA represented by the Oversight Board. So we aren't going to be putting forward any documents, and I think Mr. Mungovan on behalf of the Oversight Board would be well positioned to respond to the question of whether or not there would be anything — that COFINA would in any way be hampered by not producing documents. I'm sorry for interrupting my colleague.

MR. CANTOR: It's not our place to make that argument at the hearing, so I can't -- I can't speak to that issue.

THE COURT: Okay, fair enough.

MR. CANTOR: What I can speak to is that as currently crafted, the burden on the non-debtor governmental parties to respond to what sounds like is, you know, ninety odd requests that are not going to get narrowed in any way certainly by the propounding parties, perhaps by your Honor, but the burden, you know, associated with that is immense. And that's if you just limit it to the nongovernmental parties. They've also asked for production from advisors and attorneys, which we haven't even done the math on what that adds to this in terms of cost and time, but you've got

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multiple different law firms and multiple advisors involved.

What they are asking for is just way, way over the top. And I sympathize with your Honor's attempt to try and get it down to a nugget, and we're not opposed to coming up with some sort of rational approach to discovery here, but, you know, we're talking about, you know, two government agencies and three individuals, you know, who are spending, you know, every waking moment dealing with an unprecedented financial crisis, and they're now being told to turn over every document essentially that they've created since 2015. I think part of the problem we have here is, as I said, there are multiple requests here. It sounds like counsel was not wedded to going back to 2015. I'm not so sure that his colleagues would necessarily agree with that. Those who strenuously believe that there were defaults as early as September of 2015, I'm not sure that they're ready to give up on that. I guess we'll need to hear from them. THE COURT: Well, we'll hear from them, but what I'm doing, where my thoughts are for now is that whether there were or were not earlier defaults is just not critical for this Stage 2 proceeding, so I don't see -- I'm certainly not asking anybody to waive any of their claims now or ruling that they're not applicable. It's just that

everybody seems to agree, who is putting forward that there

was a default, believes that it occurred in 2017, at a

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minimum, so I think that's where our efforts need to be focused right now.

I would like to figure out a way to limit discovery to the critical question of what is to happen to this dedicated sales tax under these proposed fiscal plan and compliance.

MR. CANTOR: I think to do that, your Honor, and I'm certainly not going to be able to guote you back the discovery request that we should have going forward, and especially if we're going to get this done in a way that is not burdensome, both in terms of effort and expense, recognizing, in my view, the limited relevance of what we're talking about here. But, also, if we're going to get it done within the time frame that the Court has set -- and I'm fairly confident that Judge Swain was not expecting them to serve ninety odd requests on non-debtor parties and their advisors and their attorneys and expect that all to be complied with by July 21. I don't think that was at all what she had in mind. So what we need to do is, they need to be realistic in terms of identifying a very limited number of custodians and a very focused set of search terms. And, you know, if they can do that, we are absolutely willing to have a discussion with them about, you know, how we get from Point A to Point B. But where we are now doesn't help anyone who's interested in actually moving this

case forward rather than just merely beating up the government.

THE COURT: So let me make it clear, to the extent it needs to be made clear, and I hope it doesn't, that it is not the Court's goal to run up bills and to have unnecessary discovery or other legal fees, which will be huge in this case, we recognize; but the Court, and I won't be presumptuous to speak for Judge Swain, but I will speak for me, and I believe she agrees, that we are trying to keep this as streamlined and efficient as possible, recognizing that it is expensive and it is money that's hard fought for, so there's lots of uses for this money other than supporting the legal community.

That having been said, I want to make sure that we at least move this along efficiently. There is some factual issues that will need to be fleshed out. I am not making a ruling right now on whether there's going to be a limitation to just the public speaking, the public laws on whether or not that's sufficient to establish a default or not. I don't know. I mean, it seems to me you have a problem, if you have a lot of different people speaking, of proving that there's a default, and I'm assuming that the people who are pushing that there was a default will take that into consideration when they formulate their summary judgments. I mean, I don't know. I don't know how it will be limited.

I'm assuming it's going to be focused, but hope springs eternal.

What I'm inclined to do right now and what I'd like to do is get into the other areas of the electronic discovery and the like, but right now what I'm thinking is limiting the time frame, and I will hear from Ambac and Whitebox on that, but I'm inclined to limit the time frame to the March, 2017, forward, limiting the scope to what happened, what is intended to happen to this dedicated sales tax. I think there needs to be an agreement on a limited number of custodians, and then we do need to talk about electronic discovery because I can't believe that — you can't just eliminate that search. In today's world, it's just not possible to pretend that the communications didn't take place on electronic discovery; but I think we need to really focus on custodians, the time frame, and the scope of the search.

MR. CANTOR: Yes, and, your Honor, our arguments are dealing with what was in front of us, which was a massive request. We're not going to say that never ever should there be electronic discovery in this case, clearly not, but there are issues of burden and of who we're making bear this burden, a government that obviously is not in great financial shape, to say the least.

THE COURT: That much I've picked up on.

MR. CANTOR: Yes, I figured as much.

Your Honor, I haven't specifically addressed the deliberative process privilege. I don't know if that's something you want to hear at this point. If so, my colleague, Mr. Friedmann, is prepared to address that. I'm not sure if we --

THE COURT: I think we need to address it, but we need to address it in the context of what is being withheld. I mean, I have here — everybody actually can cite to me all the parameters of deliberative process. If you all agree on it, it's really nice. I've read articles. I've written decisions. But it's not practical. So maybe what we need to figure out is sort of within the scope of the discovery that's going to be allowed, you need to then recognize that if the deliberative process is being claimed at that point, it needs to be disclosed.

MR. CANTOR: And before I turn it over to my colleague, I guess the other thing I will say is that there is then a functional issue of whether we have to log that stuff because the privilege I believe is extensive in this context, not to mention attorney-client issues that arise, and the logging alone, as we indicated in our papers, involves substantial effort and cost.

THE COURT: So I don't think it makes sense to log specific documents. I think it does make sense and needs to

have at least the categories of documents that are not being produced. For example, I don't have anything here that identifies even the parties, you know, "I'm not producing such-and-such's documents because he is legal counsel or she is legal counsel, and everything that's been done with her is privileged." I mean, I don't have anything to work off of right now, and I don't think that that's viable. So you need to at least have descriptions of what the issues are so that we can then deal with whether that group makes sense.

MR. CANTOR: And I think the reason for that, your Honor, is, for better or for worse, this process did very quickly go down an all-or-nothing route, so there weren't discussions about, okay, well, do Ms. Jones's documents need to be searched? We just never got there with them.

THE COURT: So that's why we schlep all of you here to court so that we actually join the real issue. I mean, sometimes that needs to happen, but it does — I don't know how to say this any clearer. You've all agreed on what the deliberative process is. I mean, everybody is quoting me the same cases, give or take FOIA. You know what the law is, so we need to apply it to the reality here. I'm not making novel rulings of law here. So I'll hear from counsel, but let's figure out sort of what's the best way to tackle that in the actual discovery process.

MR. FRIEDMANN: Actually, your Honor, given how

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you've laid it out, I just don't think it adds much for me to speak at this point.

THE COURT: Wow. Thank you. All right, so why don't -- let me hear -- does it make sense for me to hear about the dates first, and then we'll move on from that? All right, so who wants to talk about that? And you hear the theme.

MR. LEBLANC: I do, your Honor. Andrew Leblanc from Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCoy on behalf of Ambac, your Honor. And, your Honor, I certainly hear the theme, and I'm not going to belabor the point. I just want to make a few points with respect to the timing. We and Whitebox, and I won't speak for them, but we have alleged breaches that occurred prior to 2017, going back as far as 2015; and, your Honor, it's relevant, in our view, to the current proceeding, this Phase 2 proceeding. It's certainly relevant to Phase 3 when we get there, but it's relevant, in our view, to Phase 2 as well because in addition to the existence of a default, there's also a question of cure, whether or not the defaults are curable. And I think ultimately there will be a question as to whether or not the default had ripened prior to the petition date; and, in our view, to the extent that there were defaults going back as far as 2015 that were uncured, we think that evidence is the lack of ability to cure at this point in time. And that's

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one of the issues that we understand the Court had teed up for this Phase 2 proceeding, the summary judgment proceeding. And, your Honor, the relevance of that -- and I think it's important to step back, and it was interesting to hear the comments from AAFAF saying that the question is, maybe it's not even a breach; yet today, because they don't know what's going to happen with the sales tax in the future, that's not at all the issue. And your Honor had noted, the issue here as we loosely define it is, there's a series of covenants that obligate COFINA to defend and protect its structure. So the question is, what did they do to defend and protect the structure in 2015, in 2016, in 2017? They clearly, in our view, there's no question, in our view -- and we agree with you, your Honor, that whether or not there exists a default today is an easier question. The facts are more clear. We think there is, however, that we can show, and it may not be a summary judgment argument, but we could show that they failed to defend the structure going back as far as 2015, and that the failure -- and I will say, your Honor, that this is not necessary for us to prove to establish that it is incurable today, but it would certainly be sufficient for us to show that there was a default starting as early as 2015 that was left uncured for a two-year period of time. That's the gravamen of why we think it's relevant to go back to 2015. And to be clear,

your Honor, what we've asked for, we served five requests going back to 2015. We are satisfied with all of the other requests that are part of our joint set of requests beginning at a later period of time, but we served five requests that go back to 2015 relating specifically to the acts that we allege in our complaint and that we challenge are default as of 2015.

And, your Honor, you're absolutely right that the critical dates, the more significant dates, and the easier question, in our view, is whether or not a default exists today, but we think that that prior period is also relevant to whether or not it's curable and whether or not a default existed prior to the petition date. That's the gravamen of why we have sought and why we think it's important to have this narrowly tailored limited discovery that we served going back as far as 2015.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEBLANC: Your Honor, I could comment on other issues about it, but I think it's all been covered at this point, and I'll just leave it at that on the timing, unless your Honor has any questions for us.

THE COURT: No. I think I'm good.

MR. LEBLANC: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. ROMANELLO: Your Honor, Salvatore Romanello from Weil Gotshal & Manges on behalf of National Public

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Guarantee Corporation. We insure \$1.1 billion in created value of COFINA bonds. We joined in the joint requests. You've heard from Mr. Kuehn. We have little to add other than, with respect to the date range, we would request the date be slightly before that March time frame, perhaps February 15. And the question, again, Mr. Leblanc referred to the duty to defend and preserve what were the parties, what was AAFAF, who in open court has said that they're the representative of COFINA, what was AAFAF doing to defend and preserve? And what were the other entities that had an obligation, what did COFINA do to defend and preserve? We think that's very important to prove a breach. It's not that we couldn't prove it without it. Perhaps we could on the law. But if we get those facts to show that nothing was done, well, that supports our case, and that's why we think you have to go back to a period slightly before when the fiscal plan was announced, so we would suggest February of 2017. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DAVID: Good morning, your Honor. Kenneth David from Kasowitz Benson Torres on behalf of Whitebox, and I'll be very brief. I certainly heard your Honor's view on the time frame. One point we wanted to hit in particular was, we think that the 2015, 2016 events of default are relevant to Phase 2, and in particular the asset allocation

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of the disputed funds, because if there was an event of default, then, in our view, and as we've alleged in our answer and cross-claims, that affects who can be paid. Even on the June and July payments that are in dispute right now in the Phase 2, we think that that would affect whether or not payments would be accelerated on the filing of the Title III and whether or not the sub-bonds could be paid after an event of default. So we think it in fact does get to the issues that are ripe for Phase 2. THE COURT: But is there any difference in the order of payments, assuming the default in 2015 or assuming the default in 2017? Like, it's going to be the same acceleration, right? MR. DAVID: Not necessarily. It depends on the timing, your Honor, and what payments we're talking about. So if there was --THE COURT: Well, because in Phase -- like, right now we're talking about the payments that are from June 1 forward, right? MR. DAVID: Correct. THE COURT: Right? So we're not going back to what -- whether the payments were appropriate before then it seems to me is Phase 3, Stage 3. MR. DAVID: I mean, it is certainly part of Phase 3, your Honor. It could be part of Phase 2 if it was

extended, but I certainly agree that Phase 2 is focused on the June and July and going forward.

THE COURT: So if you are able to establish a default in 2017, do you get a different result for the June 1 forward payments than you would if you also established a default in 2015?

MR. DAVID: It depends on the timing, your Honor, I think, with respect to when that 2017 default will have happened because there is a cure period, even though we argue that it was incurable, but there are folks who say there was a cure period up until -- I think today is the date that it can be cured, and so if it's an event of default as of today --

THE COURT: Is anything happening today that I should know about?

MR. DAVID: No. I don't think it's going to be cured, and in fact, as we're alleging and argue that it's not curable. But the question is whether that would cover June payments or even the July payments because it's now after those dates, so whether the event of default happens today or tomorrow could impact what should have happened on June 1 and July 1. But even more importantly, your Honor, what if the 2017 event of default is not found to have been an event of default? We obviously think it is and like others feel strongly about that, but then our view is, if

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for some reason that is not an event of default, we have these other four or five that we rely on and feel quite strongly about, and so we think that we're entitled to discovery about that. I certainly hear your Honor about the burden and time frame. We, like Bank of New York referenced earlier, we reached that resolution going back that far, and we'll produce it if that's what everyone else is doing, and certainly Bank of New York is. So we appreciate the burden, but unfortunately we think it's a necessary burden to get at the facts, because here the government entities and the nongovernment entities are not admitting that there was a default or even a breach of the covenants. They've either denied information or denied sufficient information to form a belief, or they've denied it outright. And so we have to prove that, and we need to be able to get to the facts, if they're going to have explanations similar to the compliance law and the fiscal plan of 2017. If they have a similar answer for what happened in 2015 and then 2016, we should be entitled to the same view, the same facts and evidence that your Honor mentioned about what it is was intended and what it is that the government intended to do with the tax funds based on these fiscal plans and proposals.

THE COURT: All right, so what I'm inclined to do, and which always gives you an opportunity to tell me I'm way out of line, but what I'm inclined to do is to say that this

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Stage 2 is limited to potential defaults from January 1, 2017, forward, or I guess March, the March date, the March date forward. It's without waiver of a claim that there was earlier defaults. You may want to exchange that discovery now if you think it's going to be relevant to Stage 3 and it's easier to do it, you know, now than divide it. But my understanding, which I admit is probably limited, but it seems to me that the 2017 events are cleaner than the 2015 events, so that if you are unable to establish a default in 2017, you have a weaker case for the events that took place in 2015. I don't know enough -- I'm not prejudging it at all, nor do I get to judge it at all, so it's easy for me to say, but the events in 2017 are very concrete and specific, and I think that we do better to move forward on those, especially since we're dealing with the funds now and this is just the one adversary proceeding. So I think that's how I'm going to address the earlier claim, the earlier time frame.

I hear you. I'm not hearing that the order would be remarkably different. If there's an event of default in 2017 and it's not cured, it seems to me the consequences as far as what happens to these payments is the same. You know, you have the same priorities as if there had been a default in 2015.

MR. DAVID: Well, respectfully, your Honor, I

don't think that's necessarily the case. Again, I would go back to my point about the timing because the timing is important here for the June and July payments that haven't been made and are at the center of the dispute. And in fact, your Honor, if we eliminate the pre-2017 allegations of event of default, that's in essence granting summary judgment against us at this stage because we're then not allowed to argue those and certainly aren't being given discovery about those, and in fact it seems like a preclusion of some sort against us. I understand that the burden is there, but I think it's a necessary one that we have to go through.

At the very least, we think that there should be limited discovery, and we've been open to negotiating the type of discovery that we get and certainly can try to narrow the burden as much as possible. We appreciate that it's two years, and emails from two years, even from a few individuals, can be quite burdensome. So respectfully, your Honor, that's what I have to say about that but certainly hear your point.

THE COURT: What you can do is propose a different stage to deal with these if you think that it needs to be addressed after this schedule. If you think that these summary judgments -- I'm limiting these summary judgments to these events. If you want to propose another phase that

would deal with the earlier ones, you can do that, but I think that I'm not hearing an argument that is persuading me that we need to move all the discovery earlier to address the critical issues in the short time frame that are marked up for this round of summary judgments.

MR. DAVID: Well, and, your Honor, I appreciate that, and the one thing I would say to that: That new phase that you're suggesting as a possibility certainly could be something we could discuss, but I'm not sure that all the other parties would agree with that because I think everyone is looking for resolution on the June and July payments and soon to be the August payments when we have those summary judgments in the fall, and as are we, of course. And if the 2017 events of default are not successful, then you're going to have parties saying that the pre-event of default waterfall payment priority should be applied, and then you'd have at least Whitebox — I don't want to speak for Ambac — that would be saying, "Hold on. We still have these pre-2017 events of defaults that we think are applicable and prevent the old waterfall from applying."

THE COURT: So I think, and I'll hear from parties if you want, but I think that the 20 -- as teed up now, you will have presented the legal rulings as to the scope of obligations, and you will have addressed some factual issues. Some of those are going to affect your analysis of

the strength of your claim of earlier default, so you will have some information at that time that you don't have now. For example, some of the discussions about what were the obligations and what is an event of default is failing to affirmatively take a step, an event of default, you know, those kind of things, and I think those will be defined in the context of this summary judgment. And I think that at that point Ambac and Whitebox need, you know, need to take a look at what their claims are about their earlier defaults and see if it's worth pursuing. And, you know, at that point we're dealing with a finite period, and if it needs to stall things for another month or so, it will; but I think it's more important to get this done than it is to open up the discovery back to 2015 at this point.

MR. DAVID: And I appreciate that, your Honor. The last thing I'll say, I promise, is that unfortunately I don't think it would be a month at that point if we had to then reopen discovery on certain issues from whether it's 2015 or 2016. I think we'd be right back in front of your Honor dealing with these disputes, which I would love to get done in a month, if we possibly could, but I don't anticipate that happening, and so I think we would be ultimately delaying things even further if we went down that road. Hopefully we don't have to. Hopefully the 2017 events will resolve this and we can move forward. We're

just concerned, and we don't want to prejudice our rights and our allegations and positions by not pushing for what we think is appropriate discovery going back to 2015. But with that, I certainly hear your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Is there anybody here who wants to convince me that going back to 2015 isn't going to take any effort? That having been said, I'm going to stand by my dates, but I need to figure out when the beginning of the 2017 date is, and I need to figure out how we make this happen. So do I tell you to spend your lunch hour doing that?

MR. CANTOR: Your Honor, I think we're heading in the same direction, but I think, in order to make this process work well, what we need to come out of here today with is a very specific identification of the issue on which discovery is going to be permitted. If we're focusing on the alleged March default, what is it that's not in the public realm that is the issue that they need discovery on to be explored? Because otherwise I can foresee us being back here, you know, in a week saying, you know, "We thought this was going to be a very narrow issue, and yet here are all of these document requests again." So I really think we need some, you know, clear definition of what it is that we're going to be having discovery on, in addition to obviously figuring out who the right people are and the

1 right terms. 2 MR. KUEHN: Your Honor, we need clarity as to what 3 these government statements and acts mean. It's that 4 simple. It's that simple. We need --5 THE COURT: So it's the statements regarding what is intended to be done with the dedicated sales tax? 6 7 MR. KUEHN: Correct. Correct, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: So you guys talk about that over lunch, all right? But that's going to be my order. 9 10 Oh, there's somebody I haven't heard from. MR. MUNGOVAN: Good morning, your Honor. Timothy 11 Mungovan from Proskauer Rose for the Financial Oversight and 12 13 Management Board for Puerto Rico, both on behalf of the 14 Oversight Board and the Oversight Board as representative of the Commonwealth and COFINA. 15 16 I think that's an important distinction, your 17 Honor. You've heard a little bit about that from AAFAF's 18 counsel already. And just to clarify, on the date that the Title III cases were commenced with respect to both the 19 20 Commonwealth and COFINA, the Oversight Board became the 21 representative of those two entities on that date under 22 PROMESA. I think it's important to recognize the distinction of that date because prior to that date, of 23 24 course, the Oversight Board was engaged in its duties in the

context or under the auspices of PROMESA. Prior to the

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dates that the Title III cases were commenced, of course, the government was in charge of and managing the affairs of the Commonwealth, and the Government Development Bank was managing or AAFAF was managing the affairs of COFINA. And so with respect to discovery issues related to the Oversight Board versus the Commonwealth versus COFINA, prior to the date that the Title III cases were commenced, that information truly does reside within the control functionally, the day-to-day aspects of AAFAF. And the Oversight Board, while we are the representative of those two entities, does not have control over -- day-to-day we don't have possession of the actual documents.

What's important I think to recognize is that when we're talking about discovery going forward, your Honor, specifically with respect to the discovery requests, including a subpoena that was served on the Oversight Board, many of the requests seek information from the Oversight Board prior to the date that the Title III cases were commenced, and we think that information is, as we've set forth in our papers, irrelevant. And so what I would ask is, as we're framing a process for a resolution of these discovery issues, that we distinguish and clarify between the documents that are at COFINA, if you will, and the documents that are at the Commonwealth versus the deliberations and the certification deliberations of the

Oversight Board, which PROMESA indicates are not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, at least challenges with respect to those certification determinations. And so discovery related to those certification determinations we would suggest to the Court are off-limits. We can have a discussion certainly about what we would consider to be public communications from the Board, or communications outside of the Board to Banco Popular, or to Bank of New York Mellon with respect to these issues, but the internal communications and discussions at the Board we would suggest are not relevant to the purposes of this interpleader proceeding and whether or not an event of default has occurred. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. So I guess I need to hear from the Coalition just on that point first.

MR. KUEHN: Your Honor, I think that we can certainly work with the Oversight Board. We understand the Oversight Board's position with respect to the documents they have and who represents COFINA at different time frames. I think it's important, however, that if that is the case, that we obtain the necessary documents from AAFAF and the government parties.

THE COURT: All right, so this is what I'm thinking that I would like to think about more and I'll do during lunch, but I think we need to come up with a limited

definition of the types of documents that we want, and I think that has to do with defining the scope being, what do these events mean with respect to the use of the dedicated sales tax? I think we need to figure out how to come to terms with a limited number of custodians. Somehow you've got to work that out. Otherwise I could pick a random number; nobody will be happy with it. And the search term protocol, like, at least a schedule for that. And I am inclined to do the time frame of February 15, 2017, forward. I recognize that there's going to be a claim of deliberative process before then probably, but that needs to be logged. You know, it needs to be described so we can do it, and it's not to stop the later discovery. Okay?

MR. FRIEDMANN: Your Honor, Peter Friedmann from O'Melveny & Myers. Just to be clear so there are no surprises later, I think it is our view, under the First Circuit's decision I think in the Planned Parenthood case, that we believe that execution, comment, et cetera, that occurred, A, post-decision can remain during the deliberative process; and, B, our very strong-held view is that the deliberative process here relates to the entire financial emergency identified by Congress in Section 404. It can't be atomized to certification of the fiscal plan because certification of the fiscal plan leads into the filing of Title III and formulation of a plan of adjustment.

So I just want to be clear that that's our view.

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THE COURT: All right, and I'm hoping that I'm being clearer. I always think I'm clear. Not everybody agrees, but I think that the discovery is factual discovery. Most of the information requested here is factual, so the deliberative process is not going to be a defense to the request for facts, okay?

MR. LEBLANC: Your Honor, again, Andrew Leblanc, Milbank Tweed, on behalf of Ambac. Your Honor, just one point of clarification when we do confer. We think one area of exploration through discovery is, what steps, if any, were taken to defend and protect the COFINA structure? And I just don't want to go into a break where we're conferring with the other parties, and they say, no, no, you didn't mention that. That to us is sort of the central question here, and so we think we're entitled to documents reflective of steps, if any, that were taken to defend and protect the COFINA structure, both by the Commonwealth, who has their own obligations not to interfere with it, and by COFINA through AAFAF, which was its representative which had the affirmative duty to defend that structure. So that to us, understanding and accepting your Honor's view as to what I think would be a Stage 2-A with respect to the timing of a potential default, that to us is entirely relevant to what we should be doing for 2017 forward.

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THE COURT:

MR. CANTOR: Your Honor, that is a Texas-sized loophole in what we've been discussing this morning, and I think, quite frankly, we can take a step back from it and separate it from the discussions that we've been having this morning because it goes back to the original point about what is the proper scope of discovery here and what questions are relevant to the issues that need to be decided The description of this duty to defend is some sort of an open-ended duty to defend that exists at all times and for all purposes and goes to -- what, you know, these folks do on a daily basis in their job is entirely divorced from the language of Section 705 of the bond resolution, which talks about a duty to defend against claims or demands. In our view, a claim or demand is by necessity some sort of public act that has occurred, and thus the duty to defend against that also involves public acts. It does not involve what went on in the day-to-day operations of the government, and certainly doesn't give rise to a right to -- some sort of open-ended inquiry into, what did they do to defend? Either they took a public act in defense against a claim or demand, which in and of itself requires some specificity as to what we're talking about, or they didn't take action to It has nothing to do with what goes on within the walls of the government that the public doesn't see.

I promised Puerto Rico that I would

break at noon for lunch, so let's break. Let's actually come back -- why don't I give you a little longer than an hour so that you can spend some time talking, an hour and a half, all right? Come back at 1:30. This will be a topic of discussion this afternoon, but let's see if you can make some progress on the other issues.

MR. KIRPALANI: Your Honor, if I could just add one statement in 30 seconds. I'm a little concerned by what AAFAF's counsel just said in terms of their understanding of what they think is a relevant fact, and I just want to give you a real-world example. If AAFAF reaches out to COFINA's agent, which is Banco Popular that collects the sales tax every day for the benefit of the bondholders, and says, "We'd like to discuss with you a way to change the payment streams and surrender your agency back to the Commonwealth," we believe that document would be highly relevant to whether they've defended and protected; and the way that counsel for AAFAF is envisioning this unfolding seems to be that he wouldn't have to produce that email, if it exists.

THE COURT: So the problem, I think, comes from this "all or nothing." We're back in that circle. I mean, if there is specific levels of communication that you want them to search for, then we have a specific fight.

MR. KIRPALANI: Okay.

THE COURT: All right?

1 MR. KIRPALANI: That's doable. 2 THE COURT: So think about that. 3 MR. KIRPALANI: Thank you, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right? We're going to break now 5 till 1:30. THE CLERK: Court is in recess. 6 7 (Noon Recess, 12:06 p.m.) 8 (Resumed, 1:35 p.m.) 9 THE COURT: All right. I gave you a long lunch 10 hour, so I'm sure you solved all the world's problems, 11 right? 12 All right. Where are we? 13 MR. KUEHN: Good afternoon, your Honor. If I may, 14 I'd like to give the court an overview of what we discussed throughout lunch. During the lunch period, the COFINA 15 16 Senior parties, including our COFINA Senior Bondholder 17 Coalition, along with Ambac, National and Whitebox, 18 discussed a proposal that we think could alleviate some of the government parties' concerns about burden as well as 19 20 address our concerns. We've presented that proposal to the 21 government parties during lunch. And we don't have an 22 agreement, but I'd like to set out what we proposed. We proposed that, consistent with your Honor's 23 views on the relevant time period, that the government 24 25 parties would run a set of search terms, specifically those

search terms that we had previously presented to the government --

THE COURT: Excuse me.

MR. KUEHN: -- last week, last Tuesday, against a limited number of custodians. In the filing on Monday, the Commonwealth -- pardon me -- the government parties noted that they had identified and run search terms across two custodians but had identified 40 additional potential custodians. We would ask that the government parties run those search terms across the three individuals whom the four COFINA Senior parties served subpoenas on, specifically Governor Rossello, Elias Sanchez and Geraldo Portello, as well as the head of the GDB, which is one of the individuals who the government parties have already run the search terms across.

We also would ask that the government parties produce to us or give to us the list of the 40 custodians or potential custodians they have identified, along with their titles and their reporting line within the government. And we would pick three additional custodians from those 40 against whom the government parties would also run the search terms.

In addition, in the interests of alleviating the burden of review of the documents, we would agree that the government parties may apply privilege screens to the

documents. In other words, they may withhold in whole documents that are simply or entirely between the parties and their attorneys and log those documents categorically, as your Honor suggested before break.

We would ask that those categorical logs, however, be detailed. We would like to see when the first communications on a given topic began and when the last communications occurred, as well as a sufficient description to understand exactly what the description — pardon me — what the conversation was.

We would agree that if the government produces any documents that they later determine are subject to a deliberative process privilege that they reserve the right to argue that those documents are privileged at any point in the future and that they do not waive any deliberative process privileges by producing these documents.

We think that's a fair and reasonable way to resolve the dispute. It's a limited number of custodians, a limited timeframe. I would note also that to the extent that the search terms that we have proposed produce any unreasonable number of hits for particular search terms, we are willing to discuss that. We just simply haven't had any response to our particular search terms at all until now, so it's difficult for us to say, you know, a search term — any particular search term needs to be revised. We would be

1 happy to discuss that, but it needs to be done quickly. 2 THE COURT: The response to that? MR. FRIEDMANN: Yes, your Honor. Peter Friedmann 3 from O'Melveny & Myers on behalf of AAFAF. 5 The search terms are bound to be overly broad. They ask for the term "COFINA," from, for example, COFINA 6 7 and AAFAF. So we think that it's not a constructive start. 8 I think what we would be prepared to do is provide, we think, information, documents that go to the 9 10 most important issue and can be collected in an appropriate 11 timeframe. THE COURT: Will you talk into the mic? I'm 12 13 having trouble hearing you. 14 MR. FRIEDMANN: Yes. I apologize. 15 So, for example, with respect to what I understood to be the key issue of the morning, which is, are SUT 16 17 revenues being used under the fiscal plan, we think they may 18 already be there but are certainly willing to in a more clear fashion provide documents sufficient to answer the 19 20 question of whether or not the proposed fiscal plan or the 21 certified fiscal plan uses SUT revenue, and not just SUT revenue but essentially how much of the COFINA revenue and 22 23 when. 24 Just to be clear, at this point no COFINA money is

being used and won't be. In fact, as you heard

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Mr. Bienenstock say the other day in court, any money being used from COFINA will be subject to court order and determined in the future. But nevertheless, we are willing to provide documents sufficient to show -- and I don't think it's necessary for e-mails to do that -- but we are willing to provide documents sufficient to show whether or not SUT revenue and COFINA money is being used and in what years. THE COURT: So is it a better phrasing to say, What happens to this money, as opposed to whether it's being used? MR. FRIEDMANN: Yes. Absolutely, your Honor. don't think there's any dispute right now that money is being used. I will say we're willing to provide information as to the current fiscal plans and amendments, documents sufficient to show whether they used SUT revenue and when, if ultimately they become part of the public policy of Puerto Rico, slash, approved by a court. Here is what we have proposed to do. THE COURT: Okay. But I don't want to -- I think, first of all, it should be the documents that reflect what use is intended to be made of these monies, just where does it go? Okay. So that's a broader -- I think that's a little broader than what you're saying. MR. FRIEDMANN: Yes.

THE COURT: I don't want to get into is it being

used, yes or no. I want to get into where does it go.

MR. FRIEDMANN: Your Honor, I think the answer to that really is we don't trace dollar for dollar. We say, look at our budgets in the future or look at the fiscal plan in the future, and we have provided people with a fiscal plan backup model that's in our data room. But to the extent we can provide, working with our financial advisor and reviewing the existing documents, something more specific, we will absolutely work to provide that information.

THE COURT: But I think that's also information that can be the subject of e-mails. So I understand the debate on whether intent and whose intent is controlling. I think that's for down the road. I think for discovery, though, it's appropriate to get from a finite number of custodians the answer to the question of what their understanding is as to what is to be done with these revenues. Okay?

A search term like "COFINA" though is obviously going to be too broad. So you might -- my all-time favorite was a case where they came in and they said, "We want one word within six of the other," and the other party said, "We want the same word within ten of the other. Judge, what should we do?" I said, "Okay. I'll pick. I don't care."

I mean, me picking search terms is a problem -- or not. I

mean, I can make up any words I want. But what's the most efficient way for us to get that information? How do we do that? Clearly "COFINA" is going to be too broad.

MR. KUEHN: Your Honor, we could sit down and go through the list of search terms that we have previously proposed with counsel for the government parties and agree on a slightly more limited list which would, for example, scratch "COFINA" and proceed from there. We could do that right now.

THE COURT: Counsel?

MR. ROMANELLO: Your Honor, if I may, I've done this in other cases where you take a custodian, your sample custodian, you run the search terms, and then they provide us the hit list. What term is generating 69,000 of the 70,000 terms? What can we do then to narrow that term?

And so it's just a disclosure. It's really a grid that shows what term is generating all the hits. And that's an easy way at the outset to understand you're getting a lot of false positives on that date. So I would recommend something along those lines.

Obviously, for someone whose e-mail address is "COFINA," we can't put "COFINA" alone in that search because it's going to come back with every document. But there's a way to do it. We just have to share information on it and come up with something that makes sense. You can't do it in

the abstract without knowing who the custodians are and what search terms are generating the hit.

THE COURT: So I guess what I'm saying is that it is going to be broader. It is going to involve some electronic discovery. So I'm trying to figure out the most efficient way to do it. The goal of the search is to determine what use if any is to be made of the revenues.

Okay?

MR. FRIEDMANN: Your Honor, look, I think we're also willing to look for external communications between AAFAF or GDB and Banco Popular or some entities that, you know, represent certain bondholders if we're given a list of who those might be and see again how many hits come up. It may be that AAFAF has a million hits with Banco Popular because there's a really broad range of issues. But again, that's something we're willing to do.

As to custodians, we do believe it's an enormous intrusion on the governor to ask the governor to produce e-mails and to have the governor's e-mail files searched. I just think it's unwarranted in light of the fact that there are other individuals who apparently we will be searching specifically, you know, the head of AAFAF or the head of GDB. I think it's an unwarranted and unfair intrusion on the executive. I think his e-mails will categorically be addressed by executive privilege and other communications.

I think -- in a dispute of this nature, I submit it seems unprecedented to tax the governor with that responsibility, and to take the time to work with the governor personally to review his e-mails to the extent he has substantial e-mails I think is an unfair burden on the governor.

MR. KIRPALANI: Your Honor, if I could, I have been involved with searching for discovery of heads of multibillion-dollar companies who have very similar concerns about burden. They have a lot they're doing, and this is burdensome. And usually the test, if I understand the law correctly, is is there any scintilla of evidence that the actual head of state was actually involved in the subject matter, as opposed to they're just way up there. And this governor has given an interview to Reuters within the last seven days saying his proposal to the GO bondholders is being misunderstood by the skeptics, which is I guess the people sitting on this side of the courtroom. He's personally involved in this issue.

Nobody wants to know what the governor is doing on weekends and things like that. We're talking about a narrow issue of whether our client's pledged property was the subject of use under the fiscal plan. And I think, as your Honor articulated, that this individual has that information and has been absolutely involved in those decisions.

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THE COURT: All right. But it sounds to me like what you're focusing on, though, is the governor's public statements to third parties describing in some manner the intent of the plans that are proposed. MR. KIRPALANI: Or a directive to his subordinate to fix the fiscal plan so that we get the sales and use tax to be available to the Commonwealth. THE COURT: Let's start off with limiting it. Let's start off with limiting the governor to third-party public statements, if you feel you need those. If you feel you can get them elsewhere, do so. You can ask for those. But then it will depend on, they need to understand the potential custodians, and that's real. Because obviously if there's a directive to somebody, you can get it from the somebody, if you've got the right somebody. So what kind of timeframe do we really need? want to get the search terms and the custodians done. MR. FRIEDMANN: Your Honor, we'll work with the Quinn Emanuel team on custodians. I think we've already identified some. You know, a practical issue is turnover in administrations. And so while we've identified a lot of custodians, I don't know --

THE COURT: But we have a very limited timeframe here, right? This is the 15th $-\!$

MR. FRIEDMANN: You're actually right, your Honor.

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Thank you for reminding me of that. That might actually reduce the number of custodians, because some of the custodians who we identified were people within the two-year timeframe who may have left. So we will refresh the list of people who we believe could be relevant custodians. We'll have that discussion with GDB and AAFAF hopefully later today. Our door is open to communicate on search terms. Given that -- you know, to the extent there's substantial volume, obviously in the first instance we need to hire Spanish-speaking attorneys to review them. And then --THE COURT: Well, you have -- don't you have Spanish-speaking attorneys? MR. FRIEDMANN: We have a one-person local counsel, your Honor. Literally his firm is one lawyer. THE COURT: I'm just going to let that go. There's silence in the courtroom. I don't know what to say about that. MR. FRIEDMANN: Hiring people, given the enormous number of conflicts --THE COURT: As I'm saying that, I'm hearing that. MR. FRIEDMANN: It's extremely difficult, your Honor. And AAFAF was not able to hire counsel -- counsel is fantastic, but we were not able to hire a large firm, given how late AAFAF got involved in the process compared to many of the parties which have been here for years.

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MR. KIRPALANI: What about the Oversight Board's Puerto Rico counsel? Could you coordinate and use the same counsel? MR. FRIEDMANN: I don't know. I'd have to consider whether that's appropriate, given that they represent somebody else. We've already inquired as to the process of temporary attorneys to do review. But I don't think it's, to be honest, feasible for us to make July 22nd. I'll be as candid as I can about that. THE COURT: First of all, we'll deal with a rolling production, so we'll see. But I think by week-end we need to have the list -- I don't need to have it. They need to, the Coalition needs to have the custodians and a description of the custodians. The Coalition needs to provide a realistic set of search terms that you want. Okay? I mean, look at it critically and see what you think is reasonable or likely to come up with reasonable to answer the very limited question that I'm allowing this discovery on, which is what use, if any, is made of these funds, of these revenues. Okay? What do I do if there's a dispute? Do I need to -- I don't want to have to have you all come in again. This doesn't make sense to me.

MR. FRIEDMANN: Your Honor, Peter Friedmann from

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O'Melveny. I quess if there is, can we submit very short letters to your Honor and have a phone conference? Will that be acceptable to your Honor? THE COURT: It's acceptable to me. Is it acceptable to everybody here who may not be party to that conversation? MR. FRIEDMANN: From my end --THE COURT: I'm going to enter that as an order. If anybody objects to it, I'll give you a few days to give me an objection. But otherwise, I think the most practical way to deal with this would be to deal with it by letter with a telephone conference with only the interested parties, and I'm dealing now with custodians and search terms to accomplish the discovery that I've allowed. Okay. Counsel? MR. LEBLANC: Yes, your Honor. Andrew Leblanc again with Ambac. I just want to be clear about -- our concern is the limited scope that your Honor has just announced. We do think -- we understand that there's a dispute as to whether or not, the scope of the duty to defend --THE COURT: You're right, you're right. MR. LEBLANC: And we believe that if the government parties intend to take the position that if they're wrong about the scope of the duty to defend, then

they aren't defending on that basis, in other words, they have not complied with a duty to defend that is broader than the duty to defend that they've just espoused, then that's fine; we don't need the discovery. But we expect to the extent that Judge Swain agrees with us, that the duty to defend goes beyond answering a claim or complaint that's filed and it has broader implications against an issue where like the Commonwealth here, COFINA here, I should say, then there is an obligation that goes beyond simply responding to a claim or complaint that's filed.

Then we believe we're entitled to discovery, and we think the search terms that were originally proposed — obviously the modifications to adjust for an outsized number of hits, things like that — that we have reviewed those terms and viewed them as sufficient to cover the additional questions we have with respect to whether or not they've complied with the duty to defend as opposed to simply actually invading the COFINA collateral, the sales and use tax.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. This is what started right before we broke for lunch. So there was a discussion that I did say we would resume about the scope of that discovery, like who are the right parties that should be in the words for that.

MR. LEBLANC: Yes, your Honor. And Mr. Kirpalani

earlier, he gave an example of something that would be highly relevant to whether or not there was a duty to defend. That is, if somebody at the Commonwealth had a discussion with Banco Popular saying that we intend to invade COFINA, we want your cooperation with it, there could have been many other discussions. Or there could be internal e-mails that could reflect somebody had a telephone conversation with somebody saying I'm working on a way that we can invade the COFINA sales and use tax. That would be inconsistent with the duty to defend, in our view, as we interpret that.

And that, to our mind, is what's going to be adjudicated as part of this phase or this stage, I should say, of the litigation. And limiting the discovery to whether they have in fact invaded the collateral assumes that the duty to defend doesn't have any -- doesn't impose any obligations beyond simply don't invade the collateral. We think that's an incorrect reading of it.

So we think the original search terms or something closer to that with corrections for things that obviously generate an inappropriate amount of hits is more appropriate. And it's nothing to be done here. It's just when the parties have their discussions about what the appropriate set of search terms is, I expect if the topics are as limited as your Honor just said, the government

parties are going to say we have two or three terms and that's it. If it's more broadly, as we believe it should be, then it's going to be a longer list of terms, it may or may not yield a meaningful amount more. We just can't know that until those terms are run. But I think we've said, our side has said we'd work with them if that in fact occurs, if there's an inappropriately large number of documents that are returned.

We just don't think if we go into the weekend or further discussions with the direction from the court that it's limited to this one topic, I think we're going to have a dispute that we'll need to come back to you very quickly on or we'll have to be arguing to Judge Swain that we didn't have the opportunity to take discovery sufficient to argue the points that we have to argue for this stage too.

THE COURT: This is the size of Texas. Was that the phrase? Thank you.

MR. CANTOR: I believe that was the inelegant phrase that I used, your Honor. I'll be honest with you. Maybe it's the lunch break. I'm not exactly following what counsel is proposing to do differently other than what we've been discussing except maybe he wants a longer list of search terms. I guess we can agree to disagree what the search terms are going to look like. We're sort of already at that point anyways.

I think if we want to go back to the baseline issue of whether the duty to defend, which is expressly in the contract in the bond resolution phrased as the duty to defend against a claim or demand, if that somehow — if we're going to discuss whether that somehow gives rise to discovery of essentially everything that the government has done in the hopes of finding something — that's what I thought I heard. Sounds like a fishing expedition to me, quite frankly — is they have no idea what happened or they don't have an allegation of anything specifically happening, but they want to make sure the search terms are broad enough so that something they hadn't thought of previously might get snapped up if in fact it exists. I don't know how that's going to move the ball forward here.

THE COURT: So obviously of all the issues that were briefed I didn't see this one front and center. But anyway, I think where this gets limited is in the custodians and in the search terms. Because I think anybody's random thought of what they think should have happened to COFINA and the structure is just not the issue in this case; nor can you bring that case.

So I'm assuming that you're dealing with more specific directions to entities or the bank or something like that. So I'm expecting that to be actually quite a limited -- I'm not going to preclude discovery on that

point, but you need to be focused in your questions, all right? That's going to be a very limited area of communications between specific -- you know, the custodian and specific parties, something like that. Because it can't be what everybody in the government thought about what maybe should be happening with COFINA. That's a ridiculous exercise. I understand that that's not what you want.

MR. LEBLANC: That's not what we want. To be clear as I can possibly be, the reason I raised it is because I have every confidence that had we left here with your Honor saying that the topic was, only answer the limited question of determining what use if any is to be made of the money, that when we said we'd like to see documents reflecting communications, we want to have search terms for these limited set of custodians that would capture documents that would reflect communications with third parties, for example, or internal communications that reflect discussions with third parties, that they would have said no because it's beyond the scope of what the court ordered.

I think all I'm asking for now, your Honor, and it is a question of custodians and search terms, but all we're asking for now is to be clear that the topics upon which we can include search terms is beyond that one limited question but also includes reasonable search terms to investigate

whether or not they've complied with a duty to defend.

That's the issue.

And we can we can deal with specifics as they arise. But having — the one limited topic that we talked about, it gets to Mr. Friedmann's I'll just give you the documents sufficient to show how we're using it, and therefore I'll only show you whether or not we have in fact invaded the collateral, not whether we've complied with our duty to defend the structure.

THE COURT: The problem I'm having with -- I'm recognizing that it needs to be broader than I've just stated it. The problem I'm having is with the duty to defend as being too broad. Here is my IT person.

MR. ROMANELLO: Your Honor, Salvatore Romanello.

That's the first time anyone has ever said that to me, an IT person. On behalf of National, I think it's just the language — it's difficult to prove the duty to defend.

What we're concerned with is invading, right? So it's the proposed use of the funds. It's a change of use of the funds. All right? We are limiting the custodians. If there are e-mails that come up with the search term — with the use of the search term that show proposed changes to the use, those are the types of documents where we think, yeah, there's an affirmative obligation to defend. You can litigate that. But really, you have to protect the

structure, and you're not protecting the structure if you're saying, Hey, let's use these funds for something else. And that's what we think will come out of these narrow — we want to make sure that if we have a narrow search, those types of e-mails are turned over.

THE COURT: So why wouldn't that be turned over in connection with a description that says discovery concerning proposed use of these funds?

MR. CANTOR: It sounds to me, your Honor, like they could. This may not be their intent, but it sounds to me that in trying to get where they're going, you end up with random statements by people that have no meaning behind them and certainly no force of law. I just — the correlation makes sense to me. I'm not sure where we go with how they're trying to change it. I mean, is it anytime anyone mentions a different use of those funds in any context for any reason? I'm not saying I agree to that, but at least I'd understand what they're saying.

MR. KIRPALANI: If I could try --

THE COURT: Well, we have different issues here of what they would actually try to argue and what's an appropriate scope of discovery, right? So if we've limited the custodians to people with actual sort of authority over something, then by definition you should have eliminated sort of the fourth tier person who may have had a thought

with their friends.

MR. CANTOR: I guess what I'm concerned about, your Honor, is, when you get to the process, in order to capture the stuff they're looking for, it sounds to me like you need to look for every e-mail that has "SUT" in it.

Right? And if we're going to search for that, are we -- and it's not clear how the proposal works on this -- are we going to first review and make sure that a document that has "SUT" in it is in fact responsive to what they want, or are we just turning over every document that hits on "SUT"?

THE COURT: So that concern I think gets addressed

in the context of if you do a run and the terms are just too broad. Then you come back and you say, Look, I've got this excessive number of hits here, this is crazy.

MR. CANTOR: Okay. I'm willing to go down that path. But I think if you listen to what it is they're hoping to find, they only find it if they look at every document that has "SUT" in it. And the word "change," I mean, is that limited --

THE COURT: Well, if that's going to be their approach, it's not going to be an effective one.

MR. KIRPALANI: Your Honor, I don't know if we're talking past each other on this side of the desks, but I mean, it's pretty simple. I think your Honor hit it on the head this morning. And Mr. LeBlanc has illuminated the

proper scope given what the real goal is, to determine what the proposed use of the dedicated sales tax is, other than for payment of the bonds issued by COFINA. So it may not be that it's specifically earmarked for one particular thing. We don't think there's such a document that says, We're going to take this much of the cash from COFINA and use it to pay X, Y, Z expense. It probably doesn't exist.

But the issue is -- and not to take the statement out of context, but counsel for AAFAF just said, Well, if the bondholders are asking if there's any changes to be made, well, at least I kind of understand what they mean. But yeah, that's exactly what we mean. This is a securitization where cash comes in and cash goes out to bondholders.

We have statements on the record by Mr. Sanchez that says, We are going to change the way COFINA works under the fiscal plan; it will no longer go to COFINA and COFINA's bondholders; it will now be pooled. And we want to see those statements in the proper context and how they fit with the fiscal plan. I don't know why it's invasive.

THE COURT: I'm not sure we've broadened it. I mean, I think the documents have to reflect the proposed use of the dedicated sales tax revenues. That is the goal, all right?

If the search terms that they propose are too

broad because it's any random thought, then you'll need to tell me that. But I think the goal is the same. I agree that they can't have this fantasy wish list of, you know, what the janitor thought should be done with the funds. But I don't think they're going to waste anybody's time on that. If the search terms are too broad, we're going to have to figure out a different way to get there. But I think the issue is remaining the same. It's just sort of how are you using the documents.

MR. LEBLANC: Your Honor, I think the issues remain the same. It's frankly the same process we do in every case in every --

THE COURT: But you have very little time here, okay? So you start the case in the normal course of saying, Here is our broadest search terms possible, and then you tell me where that ends up. We don't have that luxury here. And frankly it's a waste of money here, so let's not do it that way.

You need to come up with a really well-thought-out set of terms, all right? And limit it -- because what I'll end up doing is just cut the number of custodians, and you'll end up with not what you want. So you need to have a very defined set of terms, a limited set of custodians. You need to, by Friday -- what did I say, Friday -- provide the description of the potential custodians. You need to

provide the list of search terms. It needs to be well-thought-out. The next step will be I guess the government filing something that says, Look, we have 40,000 hits on this one word and it just doesn't make any sense for us to do that.

I don't know how else to do it, but that's the limitation. I think we've narrowed the timeframe and we've narrowed the scope of the appropriate issue, and now we need to figure out how to get there. But that's a more technical discussion than I know how to do from the bench right now.

MR. MUNGOVAN: Good afternoon, your Honor.

Timothy Mungovan from Proskauer for the Oversight Board.

Just to clarify with respect to Elias Sanchez, to understand what we're talking about in terms of what we're seeking from him, he's an ex officio member of the Oversight Board. He was appointed by the governor. What we would propose and what we understand the proposal to be is that there's not going to be a search for documentation — documentation concerning his communications with the Board as an ex officio member are not going to be subject to production.

To the extent that they are developed as part of the search or they are located, we would object to the production of those communications with the Board by Mr. Sanchez or communications between Mr. Sanchez and the governor with respect to deliberations at the Oversight Board on the issue

of the use of the monies.

THE COURT: Why would you object?

MR. MUNGOVAN: To the extent that, your Honor, with respect to those communications, Mr. Sanchez may have direct dealings with the Board and a member of the Board during the period we'll call it March when the fiscal plan was being developed, those certification determinations, those e-mails may well relate to certification -- excuse me -- determinations that we believe are off-limits from discovery and are not relevant to the issues in this case.

What we're hearing about is a claim that the government effectively or COFINA, the entity, did not defend the COFINA structure; and communications with the Board about what the Board may want to do with respect to a fiscal plan are not part of the issues that are in the interpleader proceeding.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. KIRPALANI. If I may be heard on that, your Honor, Susheel Kirpalani.

We talk about the Federal Oversight and Management Board by focusing on the "F" in federal. Under PROMESA, the Oversight Board -- and counsel for AAFAF was just discussing this exact issue with me in the hallway during our meet and confer. The Board is a component part of the territorial government under the federal law. That's what it says, that

the Oversight Board will be appointed by Congress, but it will actually have authority at the territory level, not at the federal level, at the territory level.

So under PROMESA, it took over the right to approve an overall budget and fiscal plan. It is that fiscal plan that is what gives the force of law in this courtroom. And so it's highly relevant if the Oversight Board members are asking the representative of the Commonwealth, I don't understand how you plan to implement this plan, this fiscal plan you've proposed to us; where is the money going to come from; and the answer goes back across the transom, We're just going to take it from COFINA.

Under what Mr. Mungovan's proposal is, we'd never see that document. It just doesn't make any sense. I'm not sure what sort of overlord privilege is being certified here, but it doesn't square with the role of the Oversight Board.

THE COURT: I'm just having a hard time understanding what the objection is. I apologize. But if the documents are requested from the Oversight Board and they produce them, you're saying that you have the right to object to their production.

MR. MUNGOVAN: Not quite, your Honor. I apologize if I wasn't clear.

My understanding is what we're talking about is a

search with respect to Mr. Sanchez, and Mr. Sanchez is an ex officio member. With respect to the discussions and deliberations that take place within the Board as part of the certification process of the fiscal plan, under 106(e) of PROMESA, we believe what they're effectively doing is challenging a fiscal plan as a basis for their claim as part of the interpleader proceeding. And by looking at the certification determinations of the Board or Mr. Sanchez as an ex officio member of the Board, in effect that's where we are headed with respect to this interpleader proceeding. They're going to be challenging the Board's certification determinations with respect to the uses of the sales and use tax proceeds. The fact —

THE COURT: So you're assuming that they're going to find that the funds were not going to be used to pay the bondholders; and what you're saying is, assuming that fact, they still can't challenge because of PROMESA and that the decision is unreviewable.

MR. MUNGOVAN: What I'm saying is that's actually not part of this case but it's part of the case that either they have brought or will bring as part of the Title III.

As a practical matter to what AAFAF counsel has said, those issues are largely irrelevant. We are producing or AAFAF is prepared to produce the documentation which shows the proposed uses of the sales and use tax proceeds.

And my understanding is the documentation that is in a data room that AAFAF has prepared has that information. And so the discussions and deliberations within the Board about what to do and how to do it are frankly irrelevant to the issue of whether or not there has been a breach by COFINA or the government in failing to defend under the resolution for COFINA.

THE COURT: So why is this different than the deliberative process claim that either will or will not be made in connection with this production?

MR. MUNGOVAN: It's directly related, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So it's covered somewhere?

MR. MUNGOVAN: I believe it is.

THE COURT: I mean, either the documents will be produced because there's no claim of privilege because it's post decision and it's factual, to simplify the process, to simplify the privilege. I reserve the right to do all the nuances as well.

MR. MUNGOVAN: That's right, your Honor. I would also say one more thing. The ultimate decision about what to do, you've said and I believe the term is "What happens," that's what you've said repeatedly, I believe. We don't know yet what will actually happen. And part of what the Oversight Board had proposed last week in connection with the omnibus hearing is a process to determine what happens

with respect to, among other things, these sales and use tax proceeds for COFINA. It is not clear yet what will happen, and so we are really predecisional in some respects with respect to the discussions that are ongoing concerning the use of the sales and use tax proceeds, at least from the perspective of the Oversight Board. Thank you.

THE COURT: So that it seems to me deals with frankly the ultimate resolution of everything --

MR. MUNGOVAN: I agree with, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- which is the mediation part of this or the ultimate conclusion. The issue that we have here is whether the actions taken before these funds are actually used constitute a default.

MR. MUNGOVAN: Your Honor, I agree with you, but Mr. Sanchez sits in between the Board, if you will, and the government. And all that I'm trying to do is distinguish between those two roles. If he has made statements or taken actions and he happens to — he happens to be an ex officio member of the Board but he is communicating with the governor about what he and the governor want to do, from my perspective that's an issue for AAFAF to decide as to whether or not it's subject to the deliberative privilege or not.

We at the Board are not taking a position necessarily with respect to those communications. I'm

distinguishing those types of communications from his communications with the Board in the development of the fiscal plan, which isn't necessarily — the Board is acting as the Board. The Board isn't a party to this proceeding. The Board is a non-party that has received a subpoena, as is Mr. Sanchez. I don't know if he's a party. I haven't gone back and looked at the pleadings, your Honor, but I do know that he's received a subpoena, so I assume that he's not a party per se to the interpleader proceeding.

THE COURT: So I have a memory that this morning you said, that you indicated that you had some decisionmaking about going against Mr. Sanchez's -- seeking Mr. Sanchez's documents and various roles. Did you say something like that?

MR. KUEHN: Correct. Mr. Sanchez is appointed by the governor, appointed by the government of Puerto Rico. And while he's an ex officio member of the Board, he also has a role with the government, as I understand it. And they've taken the position in the past that he is a member of the government, at least for purposes of deliberative process privilege, and I don't see why we should treat it any differently for purposes of discovery here.

THE COURT: So maybe it is the post-lunch and I shouldn't do this, but it seems to me that those concerns will be addressed in a claim of privilege, if appropriate,

okay? And you can assert that -- I mean, you can work with counsel on that.

MR. MUNGOVAN: I agree, your Honor. Thank you. I just wanted to make it clear that there wasn't any waiver on the Board's part with respect to that issue. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

I hate to ask if there's anything else because that always opens the door.

MR. KUEHN: I have one hopefully small request for a little bit of guidance. And that is, we've talked about e-mails. Another form of electronically stored information is text messages. And in this case I have personal knowledge that members of the governor of Puerto Rico used text messages for business purposes.

To the extent that counsel for the government parties is able to stipulate and represent to the court that their personal text messages, their phones have not been used for business purposes, I don't need to get into seeing text messages. But I'm not sure if that's possible for them to do. And to the extent it's not possible, I do think that's important. I don't think there's any personal iPhone privilege. And to the extent you're using that for your business purpose, government purpose, I think that's relevant and really should be part of the production.

MR. CANTOR: Your Honor, we believe it's -- there

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are all the practical burden issues that we talked about in addition to it just being a huge invasion of privacy here. You know, I don't know which if any of these officials do use their own phone text messages for government business. But the process of recovering that stuff and reviewing it to find whatever there may be out there is just both burdensome and as I said a huge imposition on these individuals' privacy rights, quite frankly. THE COURT: All right. So we need to get the list of custodians out fast. Do you have any kind of standstill, you know -- I don't mean standstill -- preservation orders out or agreements on any of this? MR. FRIEDMANN: Peter Friedmann from O'Melveny. Your Honor, we have certainly worked with various clients --THE COURT: I think you need to talk into the microphone. MR. FRIEDMANN: Peter Friedmann from O'Melveny. Yes, your Honor, we have sent preservation notices to people who received subpoenas. AAFAF has been under a subpoena -- sorry -- under a document preservation notice, GDB has preservation notices. That's already been done well in advance of today's hearing. THE COURT: All right. So I think the way -- the

only way I know how to do this is step by step but baby

step -- rapid steps.

So if there is no exemption from private communications that I'm aware of, if it's unduly burdensome given what he's -- what the ultimate search looks like, then we'll deal with it. You need to categorize it, though. You need to be able to say it to me, These ten people use their phones, or these three custodians use their phones, and we can't search for it. You know, I mean, texts it seems to me -- I have no idea. In my e-mail box, the texts are easier to find than the e-mails, but I don't know that I use my equipment, you know, electronics the same way as everybody else does.

But I think the problem with this all or nothing is that we end up talking about things that don't have definition, and we're past that stage. The litigation is past that stage.

So if documents are being withheld, I've already said that you can categorize the types of privileges you're claiming. You can categorize sort of attorney-client, but you've got to identify who it is. And if you're not producing a certain type of document for a reason, you need to say so, and then we can have a fight about it.

MR. CANTOR: We hear you, your Honor, and we'll do that. I think your last comment raises, I apologize, another potential issue, which, at least as I understand the

proposal in the hallway but I'm not sure how it was communicated in the room, at least I don't recall it, is the issue of privilege logs. And I thought that the proposal had been that we were going to run a filter, one of the filters we were going to run on the e-mails was to try and eliminate communications involving counsel. Do I have that correct?

MR. KUEHN: Correct.

MR. CANTOR: Okay. If we're eliminating them at the search stage, then I don't know how we do a detailed privilege log, if we're kicking them out and not recovering them.

MR. KUEHN: I don't think we're asking for a line-by-line privilege log. I think we're asking for a categorical privilege log, which can be performed once you isolate the potentially privileged documents by setting up the date range that particular topics cover.

MR. CANTOR: Then there's really no advantage -what was the advantage to the screen? Because I'm still
going to have to go back and look at all those documents
anyways.

MR. KUEHN: No. You can search by the names of the attorneys on each side and say, Here is the subject matter of the stream of communications from Attorney X to Client Y over X dates.

MR. CANTOR: Okay. I guess, like I said, I'm not sure -- one of the proposals for why this wasn't so bad was that you can kick out all the attorney-client stuff ahead of time -- and tell me where I'm wrong, because I know I can be wrong. Don't I then have to go back and look at all the attorney-client communications in order to come up with a log?

MR. KUEHN: You can categorize them electrically. Again, you can come up with search terms to categorize your withheld documents and give us some idea the categories of what's being addressed in those communications.

THE COURT: So instead of it doing it document by document first, screen them out. Then how about by either affidavit or some form of agreed-upon narrative that says, This attorney was involved in these kinds of issues; this attorney was involved in those kind of issues. To the extent that -- like you would do it on a privilege log as a subject but without doing it item by item at all. Just so that they have a list of the attorneys and that they have sort of a very broad -- you know, they were the ones that we got compliance data from or something.

MR. CANTOR: I guess the answer is yes, we'll try. I'm not positive this won't be a problem, but we will try.

THE COURT: All right. I'll go with trying to start.

1 MR. CANTOR: Okay.
2 THE COURT: Then we have to succeed. Okay? What
3 kind of timeline do we need?
4 MS. HALSTEAD: Your Honor, I have one -- Ellen
5 Halstead of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft. We represent
6 Assured Guaranty. Assured insures the subordinate bonds.
7 You've been hearing from the Senior bondholders as well as

senior insurers all day. We did, Assure did propound discovery requests upon COFINA. COFINA's response to those requests was that they'll produce but they will only produce hard copies.

We would just ask to the extent there's meet and confers regarding search terms and the custodians this week that we be included in those meet and confers. Because I believe the document requests that we propounded on COFINA would include what your Honor has ordered to be produced, the proposed use of the sales tax revenues, that that would be a subset of what we requested.

MR. CANTOR: Its sounds to me like it's between the seniors and subs, not between us and them.

MS. HALSTEAD: Well, I think it is between us because we propounded the discovery requests on COFINA. So we're just asking that we be involved, that we be -- I haven't seen a list of the search terms or proposed custodians. We just ask to be involved in those

communications because it's possible we may want to add one or two search terms to cover our issues. I don't know that -- we may not be -- we're not trying to broaden the scope of discovery in any sense. We do have concern that discovery is all going to Seniors right now. What we request is to be involved in these discussions, that's all.

THE COURT: All right. But I don't see a different issue right now between the levels as far as the scope of discovery. So I mean, the scope of discovery here is what is the proposed use -- proposed changes to use of dedicated sales tax funds, right?

MS. HALSTEAD: We just involved --

THE COURT: I have no problem with you consulting with this, but I don't want to make this into a 12-party need to exchange. So you need to work with the Seniors and decide among yourselves that you can include those words or not. I don't want COFINA to have too many people to respond to.

MS. HALSTEAD: Okay. That's fine. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: So the exchange of custodians and search terms is going to be done by the end of the week, and everybody's going to really show how much control I have over this courtroom by really, really working hard to make them very limited search terms, right? Everybody's just

staring -- for the record, everyone is just staring at me in 1 2 horror. Okay. But then what happens? If you can't by the 3 4 end -- by next week, next Thursday, you send me letters that say we have a problem or not. Then I'll set up a telephone 5 conference. And I will put in this order that if anybody 6 7 objects to me having a private telephone conference just 8 over the search terms and the custodians, they need to file something within the next four days or something like that. 9 10 I'll figure that out. Okay? MR. CANTOR: Letters by the 13th, that's next --11 12 THE COURT: Is that Friday the 13th? 13 MR. CANTOR: Thursday. 14 THE COURT: Thursday, yeah. MR. GRAY: Your Honor, Neil Gray from Reed Smith 15 on behalf of the Bank of New York Mellon. 16 17 Two small points. We're interpreting your earlier 18

Two small points. We're interpreting your earlier ruling that February 15, 2017 will be the starting time for these productions, that that applies to all parties. Are we interpreting that correctly? All parties producing documents.

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THE COURT: I think that makes the most sense.

But I leave it to you because I have left open the 2015 door for, you know, post this proceeding, I leave it to you on whether or not it's cheaper for you to do it all at once if

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you want to go back to 2015 now because I know you've
reached agreements on some of those things. If that's
easier, you're certainly free to do it. But otherwise the
discovery here is limited. I think I have two separate
dates, actually. I think I have the March 17 for the --
right?
          MR. KUEHN: I'm sorry, your Honor.
          THE COURT: I'm sorry. I lost track of my dates.
          MR. LEBLANC: I think February 15 --
          THE COURT: I think February 15 for the government
forward.
          MR. KIRPALANI: March 13, the date of the public
fiscal plan for creditor reactions to it.
          THE COURT: Does everybody agree that I had those
two dates?
          MR. KUEHN: Agreed.
          THE COURT: So yes, I believe that even if other
parties have agreed to go earlier, they don't need to,
including the bank, I gather was going to produce earlier,
that you don't need to. It's without waiver of bringing in
the claims of dispute potential defaults preceding 2017
either in phase three or as an interim stage after the
summary judgments in the stage two.
          MR. GRAY: Thank you, your Honor. The second
point, and this is more informative than anything, many of
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the parties in their responses and objections asserted the need for a protective order to produce confidential information. We wanted to let the court know that negotiations about that language have been going on. We're hopeful that we'll be able to finalize that in the next day or so, day or two, and get a signed stipulation to the court to consider and so order, my preference would be by the end of the week so it doesn't hold up any productions. But again, that's more informative than anything. I don't think we need anything from the court at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. If you all agree I will not have an objection to it. I don't feel the need to insert anything else unless you've really tied the hands of the court somehow.

MR. GRAY: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. KUEHN: Your Honor, Brant Kuehn.

I had two small requests or two small suggestions with respect to the search term and custodian meet and confer process. It's difficult to efficiently propose search terms until we know the custodians. So I think it may be more productive if the custodian list is produced tomorrow, if possible, or Friday morning, and we are then able to spend a few hours at least to look over the custodians and develop the search terms after we've seen the custodians.

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MR. CANTOR: I think we can give you a large number of the custodians perhaps even tonight but certainly I will be quite frank, the number 40 I'm not sure tomorrow. is as set in stone as people thought it was. So, you know, I need to know when we get to that number. But I've got 20 at least we can get you. MR. KUEHN: Thank you. The second suggestion is, given the looming deadline, I wonder if it would make more sense to have letters addressing any disputes next Wednesday rather than next Thursday, if there are any objections. MR. CANTOR: Sure. THE COURT: Sure. Fine. I will deal with them as promptly as I can. again, if we can do it in a smaller telephone conference, that would be the easiest, but we'll see if we have any objections to that procedure. I feel like I probably have something else hanging out there? MR. DESPINS: Your Honor, Luc Despins with Paul Hastings, proposed counsel for the Creditors Committee in the Commonwealth case. I just wanted to make sure your Honor was not blindsided about an issue. It doesn't affect any of the rulings you've made today.

THE COURT: I think I'm doing so well on these

issues, and you keep kind of bringing them in.

MR. DESPINS: It's just, I want to make sure your Honor knows that right now you've been dealing with discovery issues within COFINA which affect the issue of who is Senior, is there a default, do the Seniors get all the money, et cetera, et cetera. But there's a bigger issue that involves the Commonwealth v. COFINA which is coming down I would say soon over whether this is COFINA's money at all.

People don't need to comment, obviously, but we are going to represent the Commonwealth in that issue, and therefore I want to make sure your Honor knew that that train is coming, which doesn't affect anything that has happened today, but I wanted to make sure you were aware of that.

THE COURT: Thank you. So as you know, the order of reference was limited here. There will be other orders of reference to this session. I do coordinate the schedule with Judge Swain, working within those things. So we have her schedule. That's not been modified at all, and she's set schedules in various of the proceedings, and we just try to work within those.

I do ask you, though, if you think I'm running against a date that I lost track of in another matter, you know, please let me know, because I know that you're all more involved in all of the other proceedings than I am, but

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I'm sure that will continue to evolve over time.
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                All right. I think that ends it for me. Anybody
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     have any other issues that they want to talk about? The
     weather? No. Okay. Thank you very much.
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                (Adjourned, 2:34 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

We, Lee A. Marzilli and Kelly Mortellite,

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Dated this 6th day of July, 2017.

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/s/ Lee A. Marzilli

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Lee A. Marzilli, RPR, CRR

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/s/ Kelly Mortellite

Official Court Reporter

Kelly Mortellite, RMR, CRR

Official Court Reporter